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Chapter 2
Cultures of Knowledge Use in Policymaking:
The Functions of Research in German and UK
Immigration Policy
Christina Boswell
2.1 Introduction
Despite the extensive literature on patterns of knowledge utilisation in policymak-
ing, there is very little scholarship comparing different ‘cultures’ of knowledge
use across polities. By ‘culture’, I am referring to the historically specific and
cumulatively learned patterns of values and beliefs that orient social action (Eckstein
1997: 226). The literature on national policy styles suggests that such values
and beliefs can shape patterns of policymaking in different systems of public
administration.1 But it is likely that such differences in administrative cultures also
produce distinct ways of thinking about and drawing on expert knowledge. This
chapter aims to explore how such differences might influence patterns of research
use in immigration policy in Germany and the UK.2
1There have also been a number of contributions applying cultural theory to understand particular
ways of framing public policy problems (Hoppe 2002; Geva-May 2002), information bias in
organisations (Thompson and Wildavsky 1986), or constructions of risk (Douglas 1982). These
approaches draw on Mary Douglas’ famous group/grid typology, explaining variation in terms
of quite abstractly defined dispositions which influence actions (Douglas 1982; Douglas and
Wildavsky 1982). If we want a more historically specific account of cultural variation, we require
a richer empirical account of national policy styles.
2Of course, there are a number of other variables not associated with culture that might shape
patterns of knowledge use. These include features of the policy area or political debate, or the
nature of the organisation responsible for policymaking (as I discuss elsewhere – see Boswell
2008, 2009). However, in this chapter I would like to focus on the notion that different national or
organisational cultures might influence how knowledge is used.
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Before we proceed, I would like to suggest a slightly unconventional way
of thinking about knowledge utilisation. Most theories of the use of research in
policymaking adopt more or less explicitly ‘instrumentalist’ theories. On these
accounts, policymakers draw on research as a resource for informing adjustments
to policy. Thus knowledge is valued instrumentally, in the sense that it is mobilised
as a means of improving policy. Such theories neglect a number of other important
functions that knowledge can play in policymaking. In recent work (Boswell 2009)
I have argued for the need to recognise that research frequently plays a symbolic,
rather than instrumental, role in policymaking. In many cases, knowledge is not
valued so much for its contribution to adjusting policy interventions, but rather
for its potential to demonstrate the capacity of policymakers to make informed
decisions, or to provide evidence to underpin their preferences. Thus in additional
to its instrumental function, research can play a role in legitimising actors involved
in policymaking; and/or lending authority to their policy choices. We can therefore
distinguish between three possible functions of expert knowledge in political debate
and policymaking:
The first of these is an instrumental function. This refers to the use of knowl-
edge to adjust substantive policy, or outputs. Also known as ‘problem-solving’
knowledge, this is the type of research use most typically referred to in academic
and practitioner discussions about knowledge utilisation. The assumption is that
policymakers are keen to draw on knowledge to improve the content of policy, in
order to realise political and/or organisational goals.
The second possible function of knowledge use is what can be termed a
legitimising function. By being seen to draw on expert knowledge, an organisation
can enhance its legitimacy and bolster its claim to resources or jurisdiction over
particular policy areas. In this sense knowledge can endow organisations with
‘epistemic authority’ (Herbst 2003: 484).
The third function of knowledge is a substantiating function. Expert knowledge
can lend authority to particular policy positions, helping to substantiate organisa-
tional preferences in cases of political contestation. As with legitimising knowledge,
this type of knowledge use is essentially symbolic: knowledge is drawn on to
signal authority or legitimacy, rather than to adjust output. However, whereas
legitimising knowledge is about underpinning the authority of policymakers or
organisations, substantiating knowledge is mobilised to support specific arguments.
As we shall see, this implies a rather different pattern of commissioning, absorbing
and marshalling expert knowledge in political debate.
This three-way typology allows us to develop a more nuanced understanding
of different patterns of knowledge use. It provides scope for understanding not
just the extent to which policymakers appear to be interested in using knowledge,
but also the different functions such knowledge might serve in political debate
and policymaking. As we shall see, this distinction is crucial in making sense of
the notion that there are distinct ‘cultures’ of knowledge use in different national
administrations. As I shall argue, one can indeed identify distinct national cultures in
the sense that different administrations appear to attach varying levels of importance
to research or expertise in the abstract. However, such general attitudes towards
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research are not necessarily good predictors of how far research is drawn on to shape
policy (the instrumental function), or to underpin preferences in political debate (the
substantiating function). Indeed, factors other than ‘national cultures’ – in particular
the character of political debate and the nature of the policy sector – appear to have
more influence on the actual take-up of expert knowledge.
The chapter draws on the three-way typology of the functions of knowledge
to make sense of cultures of knowledge use in two organisations dealing with
immigration and asylum policy: the German Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees (BAMF – Bundesamt fuer Migration und Fluechtlinge); and the UK Home
Office, especially its Borders and Immigration Agencu (previously the Immigration
and Nationality Directorate, and now renamed the UK Border Agency). In Sect. 2.2,
I provide a brief sketch of the two organisations, setting up a number of expectations
about cultures of knowledge use. In Sects. 2.3 and 2.4, I explore whether these
expectations are met through analysing patterns of knowledge use over the period
2000–2004.
2.2 Cultures of Knowledge Use in the BAMF and the Home
Office
Comparative studies of bureaucratic cultures in liberal democracies typically divide
these into two types. First is the Anglo-Saxon, entrepreneurial style, in which
decision-making is characterised by informal and personalised forms of bargaining
and negotiation. The second is the continental rationalist style, in which deci-
sions are based on formal, universalised rules, and organisational roles are more
stratified (Peters 1995: 48–9). Within this typology, the UK tends to be depicted
as the paradigmatic case of an entrepreneurial bureaucracy, making decisions on
a pragmatic, case-by-case basis (Peters 1995: 50). Senior officials are valued
for their managerial skills, rather than their technical knowledge. Germany, by
contrast, is frequently portrayed as the archetypal rationalist bureaucracy. The
state administration tends to derive legitimacy from conformity to formal laws
and rational procedures (Jann 2003: 95; Beetham 1996: 52; Koenig 2000: 48).
Bureaucrats gain credibility from their Fachkompetenz (professional competence),
which usually denotes specialised technical skills (Lodge and Hood 2003: 136) –
notably law, but also increasingly economics.
These different bureaucratic styles have also been associated by some authors
with different attitudes towards science. Willem Halffman, for example, argues that
according to the British approach, the credibility of science does not hinge on
standardised criteria for science, but rather on ‘the quality and reasonableness of
the experts who provide the scientific evaluations’ (Halffman 2005: 461). Scientific
credibility is attested by experts known to and trusted by the government, who
are co-opted into informal decision-making circles (Jasanoff 1995). This can be
contrasted to countries with more depersonalised ways of ascribing authority, and
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sharper boundaries between policy and science. In Germany, for example, scientific
research is more strictly delineated from other forms of expertise, distinguishing
itself through its formal standards of proof and evidence (Hellström 2000). As
a result, scientific research has tended to be far more sequestered, with disputes
among experts rarely becoming the object of public debate. Instead, such debate
remains within the realm of acknowledged experts, who are accorded considerable
deference for their knowledge. The only viable strategy for non-scientists to gain
influence is to re-couch such debates in terms of rival values (Jasanoff 1995: 327),
thereby justifying the interventions of non-specialists marshalling arguments based
on values and interests, rather than expert knowledge.
Assuming this analysis is correct, we might expect it to produce quite different
patterns of knowledge use in UK and German bureaucracies dealing with immigra-
tion and asylum. Indeed, one might even talk about different ‘national models’ of
knowledge utilisation. Most notably, we would expect German officials to attach far
more weight to research, not just as a means of adjusting output or substantiating
decisions, but also in order to legitimise policymakers. In fact, given the more
general points about rationalism in German bureaucracy, we might expect research
to play an important role in lending authority both to administrative organisations
(legitimising function) and to specific decisions (substantiating function). By
contrast, we would expect UK officials to display less reverence for research in
general, but make use of expertise on a more ad hoc, informal basis. Depending on
the policy context, it might be marshalled to adjust output (instrumental function),
but it would be less likely to play a major role in justifying decisions (substantiating
function) or lending authority to organisations (legitimising function).
In what follows, I shall examine how far these expectations about different
cultures of knowledge use are met. I shall do so by looking at the use of research
in UK and German administrative agencies dealing with immigration policy. This
enables us to examine patterns of knowledge use in different national contexts
dealing with the same policy issues. In both cases, the analysis focuses on the
period 2000–2004, a period in which both governments were building up in-house
research units to provide expertise on migration. In this way we can compare two
similar structures for producing and applying research in policymaking, within two
ministries dealing with broadly similar policy remits. This allows us to hold constant
variations in organisational approaches to knowledge use that might be specific to
different policy sectors. Moreover, both Germany and the UK were going through
similar phases in the reform of their immigration policies, attempting to introduce
more liberal policies on skilled labour migration. Thus we might expect patterns of
knowledge use in both cases to be influenced by similar political pressures, notably
the need to justify more liberal labour migration policies. In short, many of the
factors influencing knowledge utilisation in the two cases are likely to be similar,
implying that any variation in knowledge use may well be attributable to cultural
factors.
For each of the cases, I shall look at the structure and mandate of the research
unit, the content of the research produced, its take-up by policymakers, as well as
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patterns of disseminating research. The latter is of especial interest in ascertaining
how far research was valued for its legitimising function, rather than as a means
of adjusting output. The research is based on a combination of semi-structured
interviews and content analysis of organisational websites, policy documents and
research outputs produced by the respective research units.
2.3 The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)
The BAMF started life in 1953 as the Federal Office for Foreign Refugees, an
implementing agency of the Federal Interior Ministry. Initially responsible for pro-
cessing asylum applications, it was given new powers by an Immigration Law which
came into force at the beginning of 2005. The law made the agency responsible for
developing and implementing new integration courses for immigrants coming to
Germany. It also established a research capacity on migration, which was to evolve
into the BAMF Research Group. In preparation for the changes, from 2003 onwards
the agency carried out major restructuring to equip it to take on these new tasks, and
by the end of 2005 the number of staff had risen again to 2,231.
The Research Group was based in one of the organisation’s five departments,
Department Two, which was responsible for external relations, information and
communication. Recruitment of research staff began in late 2004, shortly before the
group’s official launch in January 2005. In line with Article 75 of the Immigration
Law, the official goal of the Research Group is the ‘production of analytical evidence
for migration management’. As the group’s website states:
The Immigration Law has increased the significance for policymaking of a number of
core questions about migration. In order to underpin rational policy, we need to draw on
a wide range of methodological and empirical approaches to address these questions. The
particular responsibility of the Federal Office in this respect flows from its national and
Europe wide status as a competence centre. To this end, it provides the legal, institutional
and economic bases for compiling reports and analyses, reviews the results of its own and
external migration and integration research, and thereby contributes to the conditions for
efficient migration and integration policies. (BAMF website, 14.03.06)
The group’s output was to comprise a mixture of internal research, and externally
commissioned projects. Not surprisingly for a German agency, the research mandate
is defined in a very legalistic way. As one senior researcher rather formally described
it:
Paragraph 74 Number 4 states that the Federal Office : : : should have the task of developing
and expanding the analytical basis for managing migration, and states in brackets that
this should be ‘supporting research’ (Begleitforschung). And this means that it should
review measures taken under the Immigration Law, to see how efficient it is in managing
migration in the labour market and economic interests of Germany. That’s what we focus
our research on : : : These are the questions which we pose, to fulfil the mandate given us by
the legislature. To expand and deepen the basis for the management of migration. (BAMF
interview, February 2008)
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However, this rather broad-brush legalistic definition of the goals of research left
open what sorts of projects the group should carry out. And indeed, when the group
commenced its activities in late 2004 and early 2005 there was some uncertainty
about its remit and research priorities. One of the earliest recruits notes:
I remember that at that time it was an open process. These people were brought together,
then they appointed a head of unit : : : , and then we had to sort out what we should actually
do. There was the legal mandate to develop analytical evidence about the management of
immigration, but not much more. And it was completely open how we should carry out this
task. (Interview, Feb 2008)
Others described how the Research Group’s activities and role evolved in a rather
ad hoc fashion, as it took over projects from other ministries and from the European
Migration Network.
Certain actors had a rather clearer picture of the group’s role from the outset.
The President of the BAMF, Dr. Schmid, was keen to send out a clear signal
about BAMF’s expertise, defining the Research Group as a ‘competence centre’
that would enhance the expertise of his organisation. As one official put it, Schmid
‘is a politician, he didn’t grow up in the administration. He saw clearly the strategic
possibilities of research. Therefore he fought hard to have research here’ (BAMF
interview, Feb 2008). From the point of view of the BAMF leadership, as one official
explained, the Centre brought credibility to the organisation. ‘From our side, it’s
about competence. A better reputation, and possibilities for expansion’ (Interview,
February 2008).
But there was also a more pragmatic consideration, linked to attracting and
retaining staff. Almost all of the researchers in the BAMF Research Group appeared
to be aware of this, describing their sense of being ‘estranged’ from the rest of the
agency, like a ‘foreign body’, even a ‘separate universe’. Or as one person expressed
it, ‘My outfit isn’t right, I don’t wear a tie : : : In my opinion we don’t fit in
here. Research needs autonomy : : : It should be free from bureaucracy’ (Interview,
Feb 2008). This goes hand-in-hand with a sense that the organisation does not
understand or appreciate their work.
Some of those from management had the view for a long time that these researchers come
here from the university and don’t do any work. And some felt that we were just doing
what we wanted, for independent research and not for policy. We needed quite some time
for them to understand that we work hard, and that we are not producing wild theories that
have nothing to do with the office. (Interview, February 2008)
This is linked to the traditional reverence for legal training in the German civil
service. One researcher explained how this meant that social scientists had very
limited career prospects in the organisation. ‘I don’t think you can really make
a career here in BAMF : : : It’s difficult, because everything’s arranged around
lawyers here’ (Interview, Feb 2008).
Despite the concern on the part of senior BAMF officials to ensure the Research
Group had sufficient academic credibility and autonomy, there was also concern
among many of its researchers that their work would not be viewed as serious
academic research outside of the organization. A number of younger or mid-career
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researchers were conscious of having to make a decision between returning to the
academic system, or being ‘co-opted’ into a bureaucratic career with the consequent
diminution of academic credibility.
The Research Group’s first projects were selected in a rather haphazard fashion.
Two relatively large projects were imported from the outside, not so much as part
of a reflected strategy on the functions of BAMF, but because the new Research
Group in BAMF seemed the obvious place to carry them out. One of these was the
collation of panel data on new immigrants, which had been run as a pilot study and
was now handed over to BAMF by the Interior Ministry. The second was a survey
of selected immigrant groups in Germany, which until then had been a joint venture
of the Interior Ministry and the Employment Ministry, but was now handed over to
BAMF. A third project on migrants in the health sector had been commissioned by
the European Migration Network, within which the BAMF served as contact point
for Germany.
The BAMF also become responsible for drafting the annual Migration Report,
which it considered to be a key part of its activities. As one member of the Research
Group put it, ‘We’ve managed to promote ourselves very well in one area, and
that’s the Migration Report. This is the report where you find very reliable and
authoritative data on migration. It’s a report that’s used by so many people. My wish
is that we could achieve a similar thing with other projects’ (Interview, February
2008). Not surprisingly, the Research Group has been planning to launch a parallel
Integration Report, though this is meeting some resistance from the Commissioner
for Migration.
Other topics for research were proposed by the staff, reflecting their particular
interests and experience. A number of projects were also commissioned from
external researchers, especially in this initial phase. In general, as one researcher
puts it, the research agenda ‘wasn’t really defined : : : We had maybe one or two
themes that we were required to work on, but otherwise we came up with the
themes ourselves’ (Interview, February 2008). As another researcher recalls, they
defined themes that seemed to be politically topical, and that suited their own
expertise. At that stage, the exercise was largely internal to the Research Group: ‘I
don’t remember any strong influence from the BMI’ [the Federal Interior Ministry]
(BAMF interview, Feb 2008).
The seemingly ad hoc development of the Research Group’s agenda suggests
little reflection on the possible instrumental or substantiating role of such a research
group, at least in this initial phase. Rather, the general impression is that the
establishment of the Research Group reflected the BAMF’s own interest in having
a ‘competence centre’ to bolster its authority in this area. The Interior Ministry
appeared to have no particular interest in making use of the Research Group, but
was broadly supportive of its development and recognised the legal necessity of
setting it up, given the provision for such a research unit in the Immigration Law.
However, over the course of 2005, officials in the Interior Ministry began
to demonstrate increasing interest in drawing on the research group. As BAMF
officials noted, the Ministry seemed to ‘realise that there was competence here : : :
Then there was almost an avalanche of requests, so that the ongoing projects had
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to be put to one side’ (Interview, February 2008). One of the first requests was for
an evaluation of the impact of a law on providing accommodation for Aussiedler,
ethnic Germans from Central and East Europe who had relocated to Germany.
The government’s policy of dispersing these immigrants to different regions of
the country had been challenged on constitutional grounds, as an infringement of
individual rights, and the Interior Ministry was keen to commission research that
would inform its response to this challenge. This appears to be a good example of
the substantiating use of knowledge, with the government keen to elicit arguments
that could feed into its response. However, reactions to the study produced by the
Research Group also offer a good example of some of the initial communication
problems arising between researchers and other officials. The Research Group had
spent one-and-a-half years on the project, compiling data from surveys of Aussiedler
and local authorities, which they presented in a 200-page report.3 The report was
well-received, but it was also clear that a much shorter study would have sufficed.
Moreover, the study did not provide any direct answer to the Ministry’s underlying
question, namely the impact of dispersal on the social integration of migrants. As
one researcher points out, ‘these were complex relationships’, which could not
easily be answered through social scientific research.
This gap in expectations between officials and researchers appears to have
reflected a more general problem about how each side understood research. One
BAMF researcher noted that many of the issues they dealt with required quite in-
depth study. ‘But most don’t want to go into too much depth, as they just need it for
a specific purpose, a meeting or a political objective’ (Interview, February 2008).
As another researcher put it, at the beginning:
We needed to find a common language. The top management in the administration are
mainly lawyers and suddenly there was this Research Group with social scientists. And the
social scientists had a rather different understanding of what a study was : : : Sometimes a
lawyer says he wants a study, and actually a 10-page report will suffice. We had to learn
this : : : I think we really came to terms with this in the first year. (BAMF interview, Feb
2008)
There have been a number of other studies commissioned by the Interior Ministry,
mainly to provide data and analyses on topical areas of policy, such as the Muslim
community in Germany, illegal immigrants in Germany, or levels of criminality
amongst immigrants. The Interior Ministry appears to take an interest in these
projects, and there is some communication during their development. However, the
Ministry’s interest tends to revolve around the scale and timeframe for research,
rather than questions of research design or methodology. As with the Migration
Report, one can infer that much of the demand for knowledge is about developing a
descriptive overview of different immigrant groups: their location, characteristics
and behaviour. The Interior Ministry is keen to elicit knowledge of its target
3Sonja Haug and Lenore Sauer, Abschlussbericht: Zuwanderung und Integration von (Spät)
Aussiedlern – Ermittlung und Bewertung der Auswirkungen des Wohnortzuweisungsgesetzes
(Research Report Nr. 3, Nuremberg, November 2007).
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populations, and to demonstrate that it has access to this sort of knowledge, and
it has realised that the Research Group can be of use in this regard.
In conclusion, the sorts of projects being carried out by the Research Group
appear to have shifted since early 2005. In the early stages, members of the Research
Group seemed to exercise considerable autonomy in choosing research themes, and
many of the projects were quite broad in scope. However, in the course of 2005
and 2006, other parts of the BAMF and the Interior Ministry began to commission
studies and briefings. After an initial lack of interest in the Research Group’s work,
these officials appeared to be beginning to recognise the potential usefulness of the
group’s expertise. A major part of this has involved routine work preparing briefings
and answers to parliamentary questions, arguably tasks for which the Research
Group was not intended. Such contributions tend to take the form of legitimising or
substantiating knowledge, produced to back up the authority of the Interior Ministry
in speeches or briefings. The Interior Ministry has also commissioned some studies
providing general data and analyses of key immigrant groups, using the group to
provide background information on its target populations. This type of knowledge
utilisation is likely to serve a variety of purposes for the Ministry, providing a
general resource for enhancing the authority of its claims and, in some cases,
guiding adjustments to output. For its part, the BAMF has made some limited use of
the group to assist in its evaluations of integration courses, implying an instrumental
function of knowledge.
On the whole, though, the Research Group’s main benefit to the BAMF appears
to have been in terms of its legitimising role. The Interior Ministry and other
departments within the BAMF have numerous possible sources for gathering
knowledge to inform or substantiate their programmes. Indeed, the integration
department within the BAMF prefers to make use of far more specialised and
applied expertise in guiding its policies. Instead, the main asset of this in-house
research unit almost certainly resides in its legitimising function.
The importance of the legitimising function of research is underlined if we
consider BAMF’s attitude towards the dissemination of its research. The senior
management of the BAMF were quite keen for the Group to have a high profile, and
be present in the national media. For them, the main target is the policy community,
as well as the wider public:
My basic assumption is that they want this (dissemination) because that’s tied up with being
a competence centre. And we have agreed with the president that we need to take pains to
inform the wider public. That our impact increases, that we are invited to conferences. And
we’ll only achieve recognition if we disseminate our results.
[Author] To whom?
Mainly to the policy community that’s dealing with these themes. (Interview, February
2008)
Or as another researcher put it, ‘If the Federal Agency wants to be taken seriously
as a competence centre, people must be able to present their research results and
open them to discussion’ (Interview, February 2008). This view is shared by the
middle-management coordinating the Research Group.
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We’ve set ourselves the goal of becoming a centre of competence. And we’re building that
competence in different ways, and also insofar as we do good work, and discuss it : : : We
want to be competent, we want our work to be in demand, we want to present ourselves as
a specialist agency for migration and integration and that is an important task, which we’ve
taken on board and which we are achieving. (Interview, Feb 2008)
As one researcher noted, ‘Our president stated at the beginning that he wanted us to
feature on page three of the FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung). As far as I’m
aware, we haven’t managed that yet’ (Interview, February 2008).
Thus senior officials within the organisation appear to be in favour of targeting
the policy community, to ensure key actors working in the area are aware of the
work of the Research Group. This implies an interest in demonstrating the BAMF’s
competence and expertise in this knowledge, and indicates that knowledge is seen
as a source of legitimation.
In sum, despite some limited cases of research being drawn on to adjust output
(instrumental function) or underpin policy preferences (substantiating function),
the predominant value ascribed to expert knowledge appears to be as a means of
shoring up the reputation and credibility of the BAMF (legitimising function). This
legitimising function was the key rationale for setting up the unit in the first instance.
And, although once in place certain parts of the organisation were able to identify
other uses for the unit, the legitimising function has remained the most significant
function of the unit over time.
The legitimising role of the Research Group becomes clear if we consider the
outcome of the wrangle over how independent the unit should be within BAMF. The
question was: should it remain a largely independent unit, thereby retaining research
credibility and carrying out a legitimising function for the organisation? Or should
it become a more responsive unit, carrying out tasks commissioned by other parts of
the organisation, thus being more directly ‘useful’ as a provider of instrumental or
substantiating research? The outcome was to opt for a more independent structure,
confirming the importance of the unit’s legitimising role within the BAMF – despite
the fact that the research group was seen as largely irrelevant to many within the
organisation. So one can say that its legitimising role was bought at the expense of
performing an effective instrumental or substantiating function.
This conclusion may appear somewhat counter-intuitive, given the general points
made earlier in the chapter about the importance attached to expertise in German
bureaucratic culture. We shall return to this point after reviewing the UK case.
2.4 The Home Office
Immigration has fallen under the jurisdiction of the Home Office since 1793. After
World War II, it was given responsibility not just for immigration control and
asylum, but also the increasingly important area of ‘race relations’ (a British term
describing what in other countries would be categorised as inter-ethnic relations or
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integration policy).4 Both sets of issues were dealt with by the Immigration and
Nationality Directorate (IND), by far the largest part of the Home Office, with a
staff of around 16,000 employers, accounting for over three quarters of the Home
Office’s staff.5 In 2006 many aspects of race relations were transferred to the new
Department for Communities and Local Government, which assumed responsibility
for issues of diversity, anti-discrimination, integration and social cohesion, though
IND retained responsibility for the integration of refugees. In Spring 2007, the IND
was split off into a separate executive agency, the Border and Immigration Agency
(BIA), though the agency remained part of the Home Office, and its functions are
largely unchanged.
Immigration Research and Statistics Service (IRSS) was established in 2000
within the Home Office’s Research, Development and Statistics (RDS) Directorate
of the Home Office, with explicitly instrumental objectives. Its research goals
were to support the delivery of asylum and immigration policies and programmes,
develop knowledge about asylum and immigration, and develop methods for
research with asylum seekers and other migrants.6 This interest in research appears
to have been part of a more general move towards broadening the evidence base
of policy. With the establishment of the new IRSS, twelve new research posts
were created, covering four thematic areas: asylum, immigration, integration, and
research on the new National Asylum Support Service (NASS) (Interview, June
2007). So there was clearly an interest in research across the board, not just in
the area of labour migration. Tellingly, the recruitment drive was not limited to
immigration and asylum, but was part of a general shift in the Home Office towards
embracing evidence-based policy. It involved the recruitment of over 100 specialists
across all sections – crime statistics, prisons, policing, and immigration. As one
RDS researcher puts it,
The political message was: there should be evidence based policy, and in order to do that
you need to bring in people who can do more sophisticated statistical analysis, but also
people who can do research, and research management, so in-house research capacity : : :
And that was the function : : : To deliver on a series of, at that point ill-defined, research
objectives. (Interview, June 2007)
In other words, it represented a drive to improve the evidence base of policy in
general, more than an attempt to fill recognised knowledge gaps in particular policy
areas.
The mandate of IRSS was initially couched in a rather broad way, as an attempt to
define and fill gaps in knowledge, in order to underpin policymaking. It tallied well
with the Blair government’s modernising agenda and the notion of evidence-based
4See Chap. 13 on ‘Research-Policy Dialogues in the UK’ for further details.
5It is worth noting that most operational aspects of Home Office work are dealt with by
organisations outside of the Home Office – the prison services (which alone employs around 47,000
staff), police, and so on. Immigration and asylum operations are somewhat unusual in being located
within the department itself.
6See www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/immigration.htlm, accessed 6 December 2006.
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policymaking. And in line with this rather broad objective, the new researchers were
given a degree of leverage in setting their own research priorities. However, many
within IND were sceptical or even hostile towards the new cadre of researchers.
IND were financing 50 % of IRSS and its activities (the other half came from RDS’
budget), contributing to a sense of ownership of the research agenda and output. Yet
many were frustrated at the perceived irrelevance of the research being produced.
One former official working on policy at the time noted that:
A lot of the time I would get the impression: what are they doing over there? There’s a lot
of people working there, and what are they producing? It was difficult to really access a
structured kind of representation of what they were doing on a week to week basis, what
was coming up, that sort of thing. (Interview, September 2006)
Insofar as officials were involved in research, this was certainly not with any great
enthusiasm:
The research itself was not particularly prioritised by a lot of people, and meetings where
we had to discuss research people would see as a bit of a chore. So what are we going to do?
OK, we’ll say what’s on our mind at the moment, we won’t get anything for a year, and then
the whole agenda will have changed, it will just be a complete waste of time. (Interview,
September 2006)
A former researcher describes the predicament from the perspective of IRSS
researchers:
The Head of RDS was basically saying, you need to be identifying and developing evidence
to fill gaps in order to inform policy. IND, however, tended to think, ‘we need evidence on x,
y or z’ – which were not necessarily broad areas of knowledge that needed to be filled, but
areas where they had particular policy objectives driven by the flavour of the day. (Interview,
June 2007)
This meant that ‘as far as IND was concerned, at that time we were a thorn in their
side : : : I think there was a sense at that point that they’d created something of a
monster’ (Interview, June 2007).
By around 2002–2003 there was growing dissatisfaction within IND about the
role and output of IRSS, and in particular over the perceived lack of fit between
IRSS research and the IND’s policy imperatives (Interviews, May and June 2007).
In the words of one commentator, IRS was seen as ‘detached from political reality’;
a former Home Office official described the perception as one that the IRS ‘had
gone off on a frolic of our own’ (Interview, June 2007). Some of the criticism was
directed at research which did not corroborate IND sources. In other cases, research
was seen as being too abstract, and not relevant to the delivery of IND targets.
So the complaint was that it was not sufficiently instrumental. There seemed to be
little acknowledgement of the value of research as a means of legitimation for the
organisation.
The various criticisms of IRSS’ role and priorities culminated in a restructuring
exercise in 2004, with the IRSS being integrated, or ‘embedded’, into IND. This
followed the model already in place for many other areas of Home Office research,
where research was located more closely to the ‘customer’, who had far more
influence in the commissioning, design and dissemination of research projects.
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This contract between researchers and their customers in IND was formalised
through a new procedure for authorising studies, a so-called Project Approval
Record, setting out the aims, expected outcome, timeframe and purpose of the
research. The form would be sent out for peer review (usually within the Home
Office), and then scrutinised by a Project Quality Approval Board. Together with the
new embedded structure, the aim was to ensure all research was precisely tailored
to IND needs:
There should be nothing happening right now in research without there being an identified
need for it. Resource is not so magnanimously given that we can afford to do a pile of
research and hope some of it is useful. It’s very focused. (Head of Research, Interview,
May 2007)
The new system was clearly considered by IRSS to lend their research more
credibility, and more generally to legitimise their role within IND. As one senior
IND official noted about the new system:
Now they’re much more going round to their customers and saying, what is it you want
to find out about, can we help you? Or customers are going to them and saying, we need
this, can you do a research project? So my sense is that it is being driven by our strategic
objectives and our need to fill our knowledge gaps, rather than coming from the research
community who are saying this is something it would be interesting to find out. (Interview,
May 2007)
So IRSS’ structure and relation to policy has undergone a significant shift since
2000. It started as a top-down initiative to enhance the ‘evidence base’ of Home
Office policymaking. This structure encountered problems with legitimacy within
IND, which did not consider its research to be useful in informing policy, hence
the switch to an embedded structure. Once IRSS became embedded in the IND,
however, it appears to have become drawn into conducting research that responded
far more directly to organisational needs. As one researcher remarked,
what we’ve seen evolving is much more : : : genuine interest, since we’ve been through a
process of them establishing what evidence they need, and how it’s going to be produced,
then they’re immediately involved and part of that research. (Interview, May 2007)
In the initial phase of IRSS there had been some scope for researchers to define
their own agendas and initiate projects. To be sure, they needed to agree an annual
business plan with IND, which set out proposed research for the up-coming year.
Moreover, any major research project commissioned outside of the business plan
needed to be approved by means of a ‘submission’ to the minister. Business
plans were discussed at meetings involving senior policy and operational officials
from IND, and often followed up by more detailed meetings with the specific
IND customer. However, the definition of projects was an iterative process, and
researchers had substantial scope to set the agenda and shape the design and
methodology of projects. As one IRSS researcher put it,
We tired hard to ensure their ideas were placed in a broader context – situated in a project
that was sound. So we’d broaden it, and plant ideas. So there was interaction. Some projects
got dismissed out of hand. Or sometimes, IND would say, yes, we should know about that.
So we needed to persuade the customer it was important, and why. (Interview, June 2007)
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This more supply-driven process for defining research changed with the intro-
duction of the new structure in 2004, under which, as we saw, the customer had
far more influence. The shift is reflected in the studies that emerged from IRSS.
In the initial heyday of IRSS research, the service produced a number of seminal
studies which were quite influential beyond the Home Office. This type of broader
study effectively ceased from around 2003–2004, replaced by far more narrowly
defined reports informing quite specific areas of policy. As one former official
put it, ‘They’re now producing in-house evaluation, management information. So
the relationship between the customer and provider is much closer’ (Interview,
June 2007). This pattern of research supports the earlier point about the shift from
projects driven by perceived gaps in knowledge, to a more narrowly instrumental
function. As the head of IRSS explained the new emphasis:
Essentially it’s an evidence process, we need evidence for this, information for that,
knowledge here, so that we can make a decision or make a process better, or understand
things in a way that helps us to shape policy, so it starts with a conversation that with
someone in policy or indeed the operational world, or some other part of business, saying
we need some evidence. (Interview, May 2007)
Beyond this general trend, though, we should note some significant differences
between research areas. The IRSS research agenda, as we saw, was initially
divided into areas of immigration, asylum, NASS and integration. Of these areas,
research on immigration and its economic and social impact was in many ways
the most significant, and indeed pre-dated the establishment of IRSS. In 1999, the
Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) at the Cabinet Office initiated a project on
‘Migration: A Social and Economic Analysis’, which provided strong evidence that
immigration was beneficial to the UK economy. The project was carried out by PIU
together with economists from the Home Office, and the Institute for Public Policy
Research. It was very much the product of PIU thinking, with the Prime Minister
and his advisors increasingly influenced by arguments emerging from the National
Skills Task Force and the Department for Trade and Industry about labour and skills
shortages. The study had a significant impact both on internal policy debates on
immigration, and on the emerging Home Office research agenda. It lent weight to
the sorts of arguments about the benefits of immigration that were emerging from
the Cabinet Office, giving leverage to those within the Home Office who supported
managed migration. And it helped shape the research agenda that emerged after
2000, for the first time bringing economic aspects of migration to the fore, and
pointing to gaps in existing research (Interview, May 2007). The ensuing study on
the fiscal impact of immigration arguably played an even more prominent role in
substantiating the government’s new policy. Its estimate that immigrants in the UK
had made a net fiscal contribution of £2.5 billion in 1999–2000 was repeatedly cited
in speeches, press releases and parliamentary debates (see, for example, Blunkett
2002).
Research in the area of asylum displayed a somewhat different dynamic. Officials
were under pressure to meet a number of narrowly defined performance targets,
and there was little interest in research that would not help them in this goal
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(Interview, June 2007). Paradoxically, the lack of interest from IND created a wider
margin of manoeuvre for researchers in IRSS working on asylum. Probably the
most influential report commissioned by IRSS over this initial phase was on the
factors influencing asylum seekers’ choice of country (Vaughan and Segrott 2002).
The findings were controversial within IND, in many ways contradicting operational
received wisdom that legislation on asylum had a major impact on asylum-seekers’
choice of country. However, it appears to have had some impact on some of those
working on policy. One official working on asylum at the time singled out this study
as having a definite influence on his thinking. Shortly after attending a meeting on
the report, he drew on the findings when advising on policy:
We needed to understand that policy has an effect, and so having that kind of background
was quite important. I can’t swear to you that : : : we referred directly to the research, but
it was there as part of the background. (Interview, May 2007)
Another report on asylum played a clear substantiating function, helping the
organisation argue for restricting labour market access to asylum seekers. In 2002
the Treasury and the Department for Work and Pensions were keen to permit
asylum-seekers to work, but the Home Office argued this would constitute a pull
factor for potential economic migrants. They drew on a report commissioned
from researchers at the University of Swansea on the role of social networks
in disseminating information on countries or asylum. Although the findings did
not directly corroborate the notion that access to employment constituted a pull
factor for would-be asylum-seekers, the Home Office was able to add weight to its
arguments by pointing to the sound evidence base of its policies. As one former
official described this sort of tactic,
There would be two paragraphs on the project. The first would say, we’ve commissioned
research on push/pull factors influencing asylum. The next paragraph would say, we’re
concerned that the right to work acts as a pull factor. The implication was that this was
evidence-based. For IND, the fact that we commissioned research helped them to push
their preferences through. It showed a willingness to engage with evidence. (Interview, June
2007)
Interestingly, in 2008 RDS was criticised by the Office of Science Innovation for
being insufficiently strategic and forward-thinking. In May 2007, as part of the first
stage of the review, the OSI observed that there was a lack of ‘horizon-scanning
in the Home Office, with too much energy taken up with fire-fighting’ (Office
of Science and Innovation 2007: 3). This was partly attributed to the embedded
structure. While there were thought to be clear benefits to having embedded
scientists in the sectors of a department : : : a weakness of this dispersed approach
is the tendency to miss out on longer-term, strategic research needs and to not cover
issues that cut across sectoral boundaries (ibid.: 2).
So while the shift to more narrowly defined and instrumental research appears
to have enhanced the credibility of IRS within IND, external expectations about the
need for more strategic policy research appear not to have been met. As the Head of
IRSS observed,
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There is a recognition in the Home Office that we need to get back to being more strategic
with our research, and have not all of it focused on what we need to know right now, but
to be thinking a little bit ahead what are the issues going to be in the future, doing a bit of
horizon scanning. (Interview, May 2007)
The implication is an ongoing tension between prioritising research that is seen as
useful by members of the organisation (the embedded model), and responding to
external pressures to deliver more strategic thinking. The second, more strategic
model appears to a large extent to emanate from outside of the organisation. As in
the case of discourse on evidence-based policymaking, it reflected a general concern
to improve the quality of decisions and output in the organisation. But the take-up
of these ideas within the Home Office is limited. Where Home Office officials do
internalise such notions, this is likely to reflect a concern to conform to external
expectations about appropriate organisational structures and procedures.
Researchers within IRSS are generally keen to publish their work, in order to
maintain their standing within the research community. They are frequently under
pressure from the commissioned researchers to carry out research to ensure studies
are put out as quickly as possible. Indeed, there have been several cases where
researchers working with IRSS have been frustrated at delays of up to 2 years in
the publication of research.
Not surprisingly, the view amongst IND and especially the operational staff has
been somewhat different. There is a general reluctance to publish findings that may
potentially contradict the direction of IND policy, or undermine perceptions about
its performance. Even where there is no obvious risk of this occurring, the basic
preference seems to be not to publish/publicise work. The view is that there is no
advantage to be derived from dissemination, and publication implies an extra layer
of procedures: preparing a submission to the minister, editing a report, preparing
a press release, and so on. As one former official noted of IND officials, ‘If the
relationship is one of having a customer or consumer, you produce findings, and they
can do what they want with them. There is no added value for them of publishing’
(Interview, June 2007).
The divide in opinion reflects divergent view on the function of research. Senior
policy people who think more strategically are interested in dissemination as a
means of substantiating decisions and, to some extent, legitimising the Home Office
through demonstrating its evidence base. Researchers within the organisation are
above all interested to demonstrate the expertise of IRSS and their own research
credentials. By contrast, the predominant view amongst operational staff and those
involved in more detailed policymaking is that dissemination is more trouble than it
is worth. Insofar as research is valued at all, its usefulness is in adjusting output to
help meet clearly specified targets.
How far does the Home Office case conform to expectations about the culture of
knowledge use in the UK bureaucracy? As in the German case, the initial rationale
for establishing a research unit was partly legitimising: to conform to expectations
about evidence-based research, which were particularly modish in UK government
at the time. However, as one might expect in the British case, this agenda was
viewed with scepticism and suspicion by officials. And it soon prompted the
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adoption of a so-called ‘embedded’ structure, under which research independence
was subordinated to the needs of the ‘customer’ users within the organisation.
So perhaps unsurprisingly, faced with a similar tension to that experienced in the
BAMF between independence/credibility of research and its subordination/direct
usefulness to other parts of the organisation, the Home Office opted for the latter
model. And this may indeed reflect a different culture of valuing research, one in
which it simply is not deemed as important for an organisation to demonstrate its
research credentials in order to ensure its decision-making authority.
Paradoxically, though, the research unit has played a substantiating role in
policymaking, implying that its research output has had more impact than that of
the BAMF. IRSS research has played an important role in underpinning Labour’s
policy reforms of the early 2000s, in a way that German research simply did not.
This seems to be despite the evident lack of a culture of valuing research within the
Home Office (or UK public administration more broadly). So the implication is that
just because an organisation ascribes to the idea that research should inform policy,
it does not necessarily follow that it will make use of research in policymaking; and
similarly, just because an organisation appears sceptical about research in general
does not mean that it will not make use of research findings where these help realise
organisational goals. In short, recognition of the legitimising function of research
can be decoupled from actual uptake of research in policymaking.
2.5 Conclusions
What does the analysis of research use within these two organisations tell us about
cultures of research utilisation? The two cases have interesting parallels. They are
both instances of a research unit being introduced in a ‘top-down’ fashion into an
organisation, rather than established in response to perceived organisational needs.
In this sense the establishment of both units was motivated by a desire to conform
to expectations about ‘competence’ or ‘evidence-based policymaking’, rather than
to meet ‘bottom-up’ calls for research to inform policy. In both cases this top-down
decision met with scepticism across the organisation about the value of the unit,
especially among those involved in more operational aspects of policy.
And yet this tension was resolved in opposite ways in the two administrations.
In the German case, concerns about the lack of relevance or usefulness of the
research in other parts of the organisation were trumped by the perceived value
of the unit as a source of legitimation: the unit’s independence was seen as vital
for shoring up the epistemic authority of the BAMF. In the UK case, a weaker
commitment to the mantra of ‘evidence-based policymaking’ made it easier to over-
ride such considerations. The organisation’s need for more applied ‘management
information’ trumped concerns about preserving the scientific credibility of the
research unit.
So far, then, the findings appear to be in accordance with our expectations about
different cultures of research use in German and UK administration. Yet when we
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look at how findings were (or were not) actually used in policymaking, we are
confronted with an apparent anomaly. In the German case, while the administration
did appear to attach more importance to the value of research, often this was
decoupled from the take-up of research in practice. An almost naïve confidence
in the value of research was juxtaposed with a readiness to disregard the ‘evidence’
in decision-making. The disregard for research did not simply involve discrediting
findings or playing down their importance, but quite blatantly ignoring them in
deliberation. It suggested that respect for research on the part of policymakers was
often largely ceremonial. A rhetorical commitment to the importance of research
was coupled with a readiness to debate decisions on an entirely different basis.
In the UK administration, by contrast, far less importance was attached to
this form of knowledge base. And yet despite this, officials did quite frequently
draw on or commission research to substantiate policy. The most pronounced
example of research used to substantiate policy was the research on the economic
impact of migration, which was drawn on repeatedly to justify the government’s
liberalisation of labour migration in the early 2000s. Arguably, this says more
about the nature of political contestation over labour migration than it does about
the Home Office’s organisational culture. For a number of reasons (which there
is no space to elaborate here), the Labour government succeeded in pitching the
debate in quite technocratic terms, shifting the discussion away from more emotive
arguments to a discussion of the economic costs and benefits of labour migration.
So the demand for substantiating research emanated more from politicians involved
in making the case for labour migration, than from within the Home Office. The
German debate on the immigration law, by contrast, drew surprisingly little on
research findings. Both political discourse and media coverage relied predominantly
on arguments linked to values and interests rather than expert knowledge.
These insights underscore how important it is to distinguish between the different
functions knowledge can play, if we are to develop a more nuanced understanding
of different cultures of knowledge utilisation. A particular organisation may show
high deference for knowledge in the abstract (legitimising knowledge), but rather
limited interest in deploying it for the purposes of substantiating or adjusting
output. Another may attach little importance to the activity of collecting background
knowledge, but consider research very important in substantiating specific claims.
And organisations may find different types of knowledge more or less reliable
when it comes to adjusting output, preferring more scientific studies, or knowledge
acquired through practical experience. Thus the different functions of knowledge
may be decoupled from one another.
What are the implications of this for thinking about national ‘cultures’ of
knowledge use? First, the analysis supports the idea that there are distinct German
and UK cultures in terms of the value attached to research in the abstract. And this
appears to have some influence on the legitimising function of knowledge in the two
organisations examined. However, this culture of valuing research does not appear
to guarantee that research will be taken up in policymaking. Instead, other factors
appear to have more weight in determining how far knowledge plays a substantiating
or instrumental function. In the case of substantiating knowledge, what seems to be
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more important is the grounds on which political contestation revolves. If debate
revolves around technocratic arguments, then we might indeed expect knowledge
to be marshalled to substantiate arguments, even in the absence of a strong culture
of valuing expert knowledge within the relevant policymaking organisation. So in
effect, the nature of political contestation over a given policy area at a given point
of time may over-ride more general characteristics of the organisation, such as the
value ascribed to expertise.
In the case of instrumental knowledge, meanwhile, the main factor influencing
the use of research to inform policy appears to be the extent to which policymakers
are under pressure to deliver short – medium-term results. Where an organisation
needs to adjust policy to meet measurable targets, for example reducing asylum
applications, then a strong culture of knowledge use may well prompt them to draw
on research instrumentally. However, most areas of immigration and asylum policy
are highly symbolic, with the implication that there is limited political interest in
using knowledge to adjust policy: policymakers secure legitimacy through their
rhetoric rather than policy delivery. So regardless of the organisation’s culture of
valuing knowledge, instrumental knowledge use is likely to be limited in policy
areas where legitimation is secured through rhetoric rather than action.
The conclusion, then, is that while national cultures may shape the use of research
to legitimise decision makers, other factors appear to be more influential in shaping
the use of knowledge for substantiating and instrumental purposes: namely, the
nature of political debate (how technocratic it is), and the policy sector (whether
legitimation is secured through rhetoric or delivery).
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